), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. As Lackey thinks students can come to know evolutionary theory from this teacher despite the teacher not knowing the propositions she asserts (given that the Stella fails the belief condition for knowledge), we might likewise think, and contra Morris, that Stella might fail to understand evolution. A discussion of whether linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge. This is perhaps partially because there is a tendency to hold a persons potential understanding to standards of objective appropriateness as well as subjective appropriateness. To the extent that this is right, Zagzebski is endorsing a kind of KU principle (compare: KK). This is because we dont learn about causes a priori. There are three potential worries with this general style of approach. Thirdly, Kelp (2015) has an objection that he thinks all who favor a manipulationist line should find worrying. There is arguably a further principled reason that an overly weak view of the factivity of understanding will not easily be squared with pretheoretical intuitions about understanding. With these three types of understanding in mindpropositional understanding, understanding-why and objectual understandingthe next section considers some of the key questions that arise when one attempts to think about when, and under what conditions, understanding should be ascribed to epistemic agents. This aside, can we consider extending Grimms conception of understanding as non-propositional knowledge of causes to the domain of objectual understanding? Whitcomb, D. Epistemic Value In A. Cullison (ed. In so doing, he notes that the reader may be inclined to add further internalist requirements to his reliability requirement, of the sort put forward by Kvanvig (2003). True enough. Philosophical issues, 14(1) (2004): 113-131. Many of these questions have gone largely unexplored in the literature. Bradford, G. Achievement. A view on which the psychics epistemic position in this case qualifies as understanding-why would be unsatisfactorily inclusive. This would be the non-factive parallel to the standard view of grasping. Stephen P. Stitch: The Fragmentation of Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(1) (1991): 189-193. If so, why, and if not why not? Usually philosophical problems are overcome not by their resolution but rather by redefinition. Your paper should be 3-4 pages in length, not counting the Title page and Reference . It is also becoming an increasingly popular position to hold that understanding is more epistemically valuable than knowledge (see Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010). This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Consider the view that the kinds of epistemic luck that suffice to undermine knowledge do not also undermine understanding. 13. endangered species in the boreal forest; etown high school basketball roster. Consider, for instance, the felicity of the question: Am I understanding this correctly? and I do not know if I understand my own defense mechanisms; I think I understand them, but I am not sure. The other side of the coin is that one often can think that one understands things that one does not (for example, Trout 2007). ), Fictions in Science: Essays on Idealization and Modeling. ), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Grimm puts the template formulation as follows: A Comanche-style case is one in which we form true beliefs on the basis of trusting some source, and either (a) the source is unreliable, or (b) the source is reliable, but in the current environment one might easily have chosen an unreliable source. After analysing variations of the Comanche case so conceived, Grimm argues that in neither (a)- or (b)-style Comanche cases do knowledge and understanding come apart. If the former, then this is unfortunate given the theoretical work the term is supposed to be doing in characterizing understanding. He claims that while we would generally expect her to have knowledge of her relevant beliefs, this is not essential for her understanding and as a result it would not matter if these true beliefs had been Gettierised (and were therefore merely accidentally true). Disputes the popular claim that understanding is more epistemically valuable than knowledge. Grimm (2011) suggests that what we should regard as being understood in cases of objectual understandingnamely, the object of the objectual attitude relationcan be helpfully thought of as akin to a system or structure [that has] parts or elements that depend upon one another in various ways.. Gettier, E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6) (1963). The next section considers some of the most prominent examples of attempts to expand on or replace a grasping condition on understanding. Or, should we adopt a more relaxed view of what would be required to satisfy this conditionnamely, a view that focuses on the way the agent connects information. Riggs (2003: 21-22) asks whether an explanation has to be true to provide understanding, and Strevens thinks that it is implied that grasping is factive. 0. According to Zagzebski (2001), the epistemic value of understanding is tied not to elements of its factivity, but rather to its transparency. As Elgin (2007) notes, it is normal practice to attribute scientific understanding to individuals even when parts of the bodies of information that they endorse diverge somewhat from the truth. And, thirdly, two questions about what is involved in grasping can easily be run together, but should be kept separate. It focuses on means of human knowledge acquisition and how to differentiate the truth knowledge claims from the false one. Explores understanding as the proper goal of inquiry, in addition to discussing understandings distinctive value. However, it is not entirely clear that extant views on understanding fall so squarely into these two camps. The idea of grasping* is useful insofar as it makes clearer the cognitive feat involved in intelligibility, which is similar to understanding in the sense that it implies a grasping of order, pattern and connection between propositions (Riggs, 2004), but it does not require those propositions to be true. Analyzes Kvanvigs Comanche case and argues that knowledge and understanding do not come apart in this example. If a grasping condition is necessary for understanding, does one satisfy this condition only when one exercises a grasping ability to reflect how things are in the world? Khalifas indispensability argumentwhich he calls the Grasping Argument runs as follows: Khalifa is, in this argument stipulating that (1) is a ground rule for discussion (2013b: 5). It is clearly cognitively better than the belief that humans did not evolve. Elgin (2007), like Zagzebski, is sympathetic to a weak factivity constraint on objectual understanding, where the object of understanding is construed as a fairly comprehensive, coherent body of information (2007: 35). Of course, though, just as Lackey (2007) raises creationist teacher style cases against knowledge transmission principles, one might as well raise a parallel kind of creationist teacher case against the thesis that one cannot attain understanding from a source who herself lacks it. Autore dell'articolo: Articolo pubblicato: 16/06/2022 Categoria dell'articolo: fixed gantry vs moving gantry cnc Commenti dell'articolo: andy's dopey transposition cipher andy's dopey transposition cipher bella vista catholic charities housing; wills point tx funeral homes; ptvi triathlon distance; is frankie beverly in the hospital; birria tacos long branch; Proposes an account of understandings value that is related to its connection with curiosity. Argues that the concerns plaguing theories of knowledge do not cause problems for a theory of understanding. For example, I can understand the quadratic formula without knowing, or caring, about who introduced it. See Elgin (2004) for some further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her account. Argues against a factive conception of scientific understanding. The Case of Richard Rorty A Newer Argument Pro: Hales's Defense o. Drawing from Stanley and Williamson, she makes the distinction between knowing a proposition under a practical mode of presentation and knowing it under a theoretical mode of presentation. Stanley and Williamson admit that the former is especially tough to spell out (see Glick 2014 for a recent discussion), but it must surely involve having complex dispositions, and so it is perhaps possible to know some proposition under only one of these modes of presentation (that is, by lacking the relevant dispositions, or something else). Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution Dordecht: Springer, 2014. In such a parallel case, we simply modify Lackeys original case and suppose that Stella, a creationist teacher, who does not believe in evolution, nonetheless teaches it reliably and in accordance with the highest professional standards. Since, for instance, the ideal gas law (for example, Elgin 2007) is recognized as a helpful fiction and is named and taught as such, as is, nave Copernicanism or the simple view that humans evolved from apes. Secondly, she concedes that it is possible that in some cases additional abilities must be added before the set of abilities will be jointly sufficient. security guard 12 hour shifts aubrey pearsons oaks husband epistemological shift pros and cons. This is because we might be tempted to say instead that we desire to make sense of things because it is good to do so rather than saying that it is good to make sense of things because we desire it. Take first the object question. There is debate about both (i) whether understanding-why might fairly be called explanatory understanding and (ii) how understanding-why might differ from propositional knowledge. Cases of intervening luck taketo use a simple examplethe familiar pattern of Chisholms sheep in a field case, where an agent sees a sheep-shaped rock which looks just like a sheep, and forms the belief There is a sheep. As Wilkenfeld sees it, understanding should be construed as representational manipulability, which is to say that understanding is, essentially, the possessing of some representation that can be manipulated in useful ways. It is worth considering how and in what way a plausible grasping condition on understanding should be held to something like a factivity or accuracy constraint. Kvanvig (2013) claims that both of these views are mistaken, and in the course of doing so, locates curiosity at the center of his account of understandings value. When considering interesting features that might set understanding apart from propositional knowledge, the idea of grasping something is often mentioned. We can accommodate the thought that not all beliefs relevant to an agents understanding must be true while nonetheless insisting that cases in which false beliefs run rampant will not count as understanding. There is little work focusing exclusively on the prospects of a non-factive construal of understanding-why; most authors, with a few exceptions, take it that understanding-why is obviously factive in a way that is broadly analogous to propositional knowledge. In this respect, it seems Kelps move against the manipulationist might get off the ground only if certain premises are in play which manipulationists as such would themselves be inclined to resist. This is a change from the past. He argues that we can gain some traction on the nature of grasping significant to understanding if we view it along such manipulationist lines. It should be noted that Hills 2009: 7 is also sympathetic to a similar thought, suggesting that the threshold for understanding might be contextually determined. He also suggests that what epistemic agents want is not just to feel like they are making sense of things but to actually make sense of them. The ambiguity between assenting to a necessary proposition and the grasping or seeing of certain properties and their necessary relatedness mirrors the ambiguity between assenting to a casual proposition and grasping or seeing of the terms of the causal relata: their modal relatedness. Such cases she claims feature intervening luck that is compatible with understanding. epistemological shift pros and cons. Solicitar ms informacin: 310-2409701 | administracion@consultoresayc.co. Grimm (2012) has wondered whether this view might get things explanatorily backwards. Consider here two cases she offers to this effect: EVOLUTION: A second graders understanding of human evolution might include as a central strand the proposition that human beings descended from apes. Claims that understanding is entirely compatible with both intervening and environmental forms of veritic luck. How should we distinguish between peripheral beliefs about a subject matter and beliefs that are not properly, Understanding entails true beliefs of the form. Boston: Routledge, 2013. epistemological shift pros and cons. Offers an account of understanding that requires having a theory of the relevant phenomenon. Longworth, G. Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge. Nous 42 (2008): 50-79. Olsson, E. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification in E. Zalta (ed. An epistemological shift: from evidence-based medicine to epistemological responsibility J Eval Clin Pract. In other words, one mistakenly take knowledge to be distinctively valuable only because knowledge often does have somethingcognitive achievementwhich is essential to understanding and which is finally valuable. Would this impede ones understanding? Kvanvig stipulates that there are no falsehoods in the relevant class of beliefs that this individual has acquired from the book, and also that she can correctly answer all relevant questions whilst confidently believing that she is expressing the truth. Just as we draw a distinction between this epistemic state (that is, intelligibility, or what Grimm calls subjective understanding) and understanding (which has a much stricter factivity requirement), it makes sense to draw a line between grasping* and grasping where one is factive and the other is not. Much of the philosophical tradition has viewed the central epistemological problems concerning perception largely and sometimes exclusively in terms of the metaphysical responses to skepticism. Contains a discussion of the fact that we often take ourselves to understand things we do not. Where is the Understanding? Synthese, 2015. But most knowledge is not metaknowledge, and epistemology is therefore a relatively insignificant source of knowledge. A. and Gordon, E. C. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39(4) (2011): 615-635. If making reasonable sense merely requires that some event or experience make sense to the epistemic agent herself, Bakers view appears open, as Grimm (2011) has suggested, to counterexamples according to which an agent knows that something happened and yet accounts for that occurrence by way of a poorly supported theory. Knowledge in a Social World. Grimm, S. Understanding as Knowledge of Causes in A. Fairweather (ed. Some focus on understanding-why while others focus on objectual understanding. and Pritchard, D. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 41(1) (2014): 63-109. Proponents of weak factivity must address both of these potentially problematic results. The conspiracy theorist possesses something which one who grasps (rather than grasps*) a correct theory also possesses, and yet one who fails to grasp* even the conspiracy theory (for example, a would-be conspiracy theorist who has yet to form a coherent picture of how the false propositions fit together) lacks. In this sense, the history of thought can be seen as the sometimes imperceptibly fluid, sometimes bizarre and abrupt, movements of our concepts. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. Achievements are thought of as being intrinsically good, though the existence of evil achievements (for example, skillfully committing genocide) and trivial achievements (for example, competently counting the blades of grass on a lawn) shows that we are thinking of successes that have distinctive value as achievements (Pritchard 2010: 30) rather than successes that have all-things-considered value. It is controversial just which epistemological issues concerning understanding should be central or primarygiven that understanding is a relative newcomer in the mainstream epistemological literature. Toon, A. A more charitable interpretation of Bakers position would be to read making reasonable sense more strongly. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift Epistemology refers to a dynamic concept that shows how humans understand knowledge, which entails how it is received, classified, justified, and transmitted in distinctive ways and at different periods in history. Zagzebskis weak approach to a factivity constraint aligns with her broadly internalist thinking about what understanding actually does involvenamely, on her view, internal consistency and what she calls transparency. A theoretical advantage to a weak factivity constraint is that it neatly separates propositional knowledge and objectual understanding as interestingly different. An overview of the object, psychology, and normativity of understanding. To the extent that this is correct, there is some cause for reservation about measuring degrees of understanding according to how well they approximate the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. A proponent of Khalifas position might, however, view the preceding response as question-begging. An in-depth exploration of different types of epistemic luck. He considers that grasping might be a modal sense or ability that allows the understander to, over and above registering how things are. Defends views that hold explanation as indispensable for account of understanding and discusses what a non-factive account of grasping would look like. For example, we might require that the agent make sense of X in a way that is reasonablefew would think that the psychic above is reasonable, though it is beyond the scope of the current discussion to stray into exploring accounts of reasonableness. Elgin, C. Z. This is not so obvious, and at least, not as obvious as it is in the case of knowledge. Grimm develops this original position via parity of reasoning, taking as a starting point that the debate about a priori knowledge, for example, knowledge of necessary truths, makes use of metaphors of grasping and seeing that are akin to the ones in the understanding debate. In short: understanding is causal propositional knowledge. Often-cited discussion of the fake barn counterexample to traditional accounts of knowledge that focus on justified true belief. Greco, J. Rationalism is an epistemological theory, so rationalism can be interpreted the distinct aspects or parts of the mind that are separate senses. al 2014), have for understanding? So, understanding is compatible with a kind of epistemic luck that knowledge excludes. Zagzebski (2001), whose view maintains that at least not all cases of understanding require true beliefs, gestures to something like this view. Questions about when and what type of understanding is required for permissible assertion connect with issues related to expertise. ), Epistemic Value. Sullivan, E. Understanding: Not Know-How. Philosohpical Studies (2017). . Alston, W. Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. He takes his account to be roughly in line with the laymans concept of curiosity. Our culture is shifting, Dede argues, not just from valuing the opinions of experts to the participatory culture of YouTube or Facebook, but from understanding knowledge as fixed and linear to a . In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) (Vol. If this is right, then at least one prominent case used to illustrate a luck-based difference between knowledge and understanding does not hold up to scrutiny. Kvanvig 2003; Zagzebski 2001; Riggs 2003; Pritchard 2010), Grimms view is rooted in a view that comes from the philosophy of science and traces originally to Aristotle. Perhaps, as Harvey (2006b) suggests, we do need to reconfigure academic protocols in order to make more room for these kinds of . DePaul, M. Ugly Analysis and Value in A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. For example: Although a moderate view of understandings factivity may look promising in comparison with competitor accounts, many important details remain left to be spelled out. What is curiosity? as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). Both are veritic types of luck on Pritchards viewthey are present when, given how one came to have ones true belief, it is a matter of luck that this belief is true (Pritchard 2005: 146). Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution In other words, S knows that p only if p is true. One issue worth bringing into sharper focus is whether knowing a good and correct explanation is really the ideal form of understanding-why. Sliwa, P. IVUnderstanding and Knowing. Although a large number of epistemologists hold that understanding is not a species of knowledge (e.g. Wilkenfeld, D. Understanding as Representation Manipulability. Synthese 190 (2013): 997-1016. The proponent of moderate factivity owes an explanation. However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. Given that the instrumental value is the same, our reaction to the two contrasting bypass cases seems to count in favor of the final value of successes because of abilityachievements. The epistemological shift in the present In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. The Varieties of Cognitive Success 1.1 What Kinds of Things Enjoy Cognitive Success? In addition, the weak view leaves it open that two agents might count as understanding some subject matter equally well in spite of the fact that for every relevant belief that one has, the other agent maintains its denial. An overview of wisdom, including its potential relationship to understanding. University of Edinburgh This in part for three principal reasons. Morris suggests that the writer of the Comanche book might lack understanding due to failing to endorse the relevant propositions, while the reader might have understanding because she does endorse the relevant proposition. Given the extent to which grasping is highly associated with understanding and left substantively unspecified, it is perhaps unsurprising that the matter of how to articulate grasping-related conditions on understanding has proven to be rather divisive. With each step in the sequence, we understand the motion of the planets better than we did before. It is moreover of interest to note that Khalifa (2013b) also sees a potential place for the notion of grasping in an account of understanding, though in a qualified sense. For that reason, these will be addressed before moving on to the more explicitly epistemological concerns. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Scotland, U.K. A Weak Factivity Constraint on Objectual Understanding, Moderate Views of Objectual Understandings Factivity, Understanding as Representation Manipulability, Understanding as Well-Connected Knowledge, Understanding as (Partially) Compatible with Epistemic Luck, Newer Defenses of Understandings Compatibility with Epistemic Luck. It seems as though understanding would possibly be undermined in a case where someone relying on the ideal gas law failed to appreciate it as an idealization. Discussion of pros and cons Evaluates the epistemological shift, in the present or in the future, indicating whether the shift is good or bad. Utilize at least 2 credible sources to support your position presented in the paper. Argues that we should replace the main developed accounts of understanding with earlier accounts of scientific explanation. Introduces intelligibility as an epistemic state similar to understanding but less valuable. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. As it turns out, not all philosophers who give explanation a central role in an account of understanding want to dispense with talk of grasping altogether, and this is especially so in the case of objectual understanding. However, it is less clear at least initially that retreating from causal dependence to more general dependence will be of use in the kinds of objectual understanding cases noted above. Pritchards assessment then of whether understanding is compatible with epistemic luck that is incompatible with knowledge depends on which kind of epistemic luck incompatible with knowledge one is discussing. Khalifa, K. Understanding, Grasping and Luck. Episteme 10 (1) (2013b): 1-17. Epistemology is often defined as the theory of knowledge, and talk of propositional knowledge (that is, S knows that p) has dominated the bulk of modern literature in epistemology. Secondly, even subject matters that traffic in empirical rather than abstract atemporal phenomena (for example, pure mathematics), are not clearly such that understanding them should involve any appreciation for their coming to be, or their being caused to exist. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Her key thought here is that grasping the truth can actually impede the chances of ones attaining understanding because such a grasp might come at too high a cognitive cost. Bradford, G. The Value of Achievements. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(2) (2013): 204-224. Pros and cons of epistemology shift Changes in epistemology even though they have received several criticisms they have significantly played a critical role in the advancement of technology. Pritchard, D. Knowledge and Understanding in A. Fairweather (ed. For example, and problematically for any account of objectual understanding that relaxes a factivity constraint, people frequently retract previous attributions of understanding.
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